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The Florida Supreme Court decided about four hundred cases during
the period reported from April 13, 1954 through July 6, 1954. Those
opinions (excluding about 250 memorandum opinions and a few others
not considered of sufficient importance to be noted here) found in
72 So.2d 28 to 73 So.2d 905 are herewith reported. In addition, nine
federal cases interpretive of Florida law are included. These were found
from 211 F.2d 705 to 212 F.2d 709 (1954); and 118 F. Supp. 568 to 120
F. Supp. 591 (1954).
ADINI1STRATIvE', LAW. Administrative agencies: Venue rights. The
venue rights of a governmental agency of the State of Florida to be
sued at its official residence (the state capital) will not be waived unless
there is an emergency or the plaintiffs are in immediate danger of being
deprived of their rights.'
Certificates of public convenience. Four common carriers had the
ability and authority to render service on a particular product. It was
contrary to statute2 for The Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Com-
mission to grant a new certificate of public convenience to another carrier
without first granting the existing carriers an opportunity to render the
service.
3
Florida Board of Optometry: Powers. The Florida State Board of
Optometry did not exceed its statutory powers4 by issuing regulations
limiting the size of lettering on optometrists' doors and office windows,
prohibiting painted or decalcomania eyes in advertising and limiting the
size and content of professional cards.5
Florida Railroad and Public Utility Commission: Extent of power.
The statute6 which provided that the Florida Railroad and Public Utility
Commission should have exclusive jurisdiction in supervising and regulating
the rates of public utilities invalidated provisions in the charter of the
City of Miami authorizing the City Commission to prescribe more detailed
forms of account for those utilities within its jurisdiction/
*This issue of the Quarterly Synopsis was written by Richard 11. Parker and
edited by George R. Georgieff.
1. Dowdy v. Lawton, 72 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1954).
2. FLA. STAT. § 323.04(3) (1951).
3. Redwing Carriers, inc. v. Mack, 73 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1954).
4. FLA. STAT. § 463.05 (1951).
5. Fisher v. Schumacher, 72 So.2d 804 (Fla. 1954).
6. FLA. STAT. § 366.01 et seq. (1951).
7. Florida Power and Light Co. v. City of Miami, 72 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1954).
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State Road Department: Issuance of bonds. The State Road De-
partment may issue bridge revenue bonds payable from anticipated bridge
tolls. Such bonds would not constitute "Bonds" of the state or any
other political subdivision and would not, therefore, be within the con-
stitutional provision8 requiring the approval of electors before the issuance
of bonds.9
AGENCY. Ratification. Testimony by the employer that he would
re-employ an employee did not constitute a ratification of a criminal
assault committed by that employee while working for the employer but
outside the scope of employment. 10
Master and servant: Scope of employment. In deciding insurer's
liability under a policy excluding injuries sustained by employees in the
course of employment, it was held that the policy did not cover an
employee who, while being given a ride home from work in one of the
employer's vehicles, was injured in attempting to free the truck from the
mud. 11
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. Testimony by attorney. Statute 12 forbids
an attorney from testifying on behalf of his client except as to merely
formal matters or when such testimony is essential to the ends of justice.
Counsel should anticipate the scope of his testimony and, if it goes beyond
the statutory limitations, he should advise his client and make proper
arrangements for another counsel to handle the trial.
12
BrLLS AND NOTES. Limitation of action. An agreement entered into
in 1927 purported to extend the time of payment of a note due in 1927
to 1930 only on the condition that accrued interest be paid by July of
1927. This condition was breached. An action brought on the note
in 1948 was barred by the twenty year statute of limitations 4 since the cause
of action existed and could have been brought at any time after the
breach of the condition.' 5
CONFLICT OF LAWS. Divorce: Foreign decrees. In order to receive
a Florida divorce based on the decree of another state, such decree must
be final and absolute. 1" An interlocutory decree granted by the courts
of California was not such a final and absolute decree and, therefore,
did not have to be accorded full faith and credit in the Florida courts.'1
8. FLA. CONST., Art. IX, §6.
9. State v. Florida State Improvement Commission, 72 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1954).
10. Riddle v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 73 So.Zd 71 (Fla. 1954).
11. Inland Mutual Insurance Co. v. Elizley, 119 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
12. FA. STAT. Supreme Court Rules, Code of Ethics, rule B, § (1), subd. 19
(1951).
13. Millican v. -lunter, 73 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1954).
14. FLA. STAT. §95.11 (1951).
15. Moynihan v. Elliot, 211 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1954).
16. FLA. STAT. §65.04 (1951).
17. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 72 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1954).
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Foreign cause of action. Federal District Courts sitting in Florida
must conform to the conflict of laws rules of the State. Hence, a cause
of action created by the law of Brazil for the death of an employee in
Brazil could not be enforced in Florida if such enforcement was contrary
to the public policy of the state as expressed by the Workman's Com-
pensation Act.' Acceptance of benefits under this act barred the claimants
from any other recovery.'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Equal protection: Taxation. A statute20 pro-
viding for an additional graduated tax upon the gross receipts of dog tracks
based solely on the size of cach track's pari-mutuel pool was held un-
constitutional as being violative of the equal protection clause of the
Federal 2' and State -22 Constitution.
231
CONTRACTS. Damages: Security deposits. Tenant defaulted in the
payment of rent; the landlord properly treated this as a termination of
the lease and repossessed the premises and used them for his own purposes
for the remainder of the term. In a suit by the tenant to recover one
year's rent given the landlord as a deposit (such sum to be forfeited if
the tenant defaulted), the sum, contrary to the usual rule, was presumptively
considered to be liquidated damages and not a penalty.24
Misrepresentation: Waiver. In an action for rescision and cancellation
of a contract to purchase all the stock of a corporation due to the alleged
fraud of the seller, operation of the business for seventeen months prior
to the bringing of suit was held to waive the alleged statements and acts
of misrepresentation.
25
Nature of transaction: Intent of parties. Whether a real estate trans-
action is a sale or a mortgage depends on the intention of the parties.
This is shown by all surrounding circumstances and the mere fact that
the instrument expressly states that the transaction is a sale is not binding
if there is sufficient evidence to the contrary. 26
Specific performance: Mutuality of remedy. Plaintiff agreed to per-
form certain personal services for defendant in exchange for defendant's
promise of stock in his corporation. Specific performance for the stock
did lie even though plaintiff had not fully executed all portions of his
agreement. Although the court would not have compelled plaintiff to
perform his personal services, specific performance was had here by
plaintiff even though there was no mutuality of remedy. 27
18. FLA. S'TAT. c. 440 (1951).
19. Urda v. Pan American Airways, 211 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1954).
20. FLA. ST'T. §550.16 (1953).
21. U.S. COXST. AMEND. XlV.
22. FLA. CONs'r. DrCL. oF Ricrrs, fl.
23. Volusia County Kennel Club v. Haggard, 73 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1954).
24. [lyman v. Cohen, 73 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
25, Benn v. Key Vest Propane- Gas Corp., 72 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1954).
26. Rosenthal v. Le May, 72 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1954).
27. Lewis v. Arthur, 72 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1954).
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CORPORATIONS. Voting deadlock. Two stockholders each owned one
half of the stock in a corporation which was created for the purpose of
dealing in realty. Both stockholders desired to sell all of the realty held
by the corporation but could not agree on how such a sale should be
consummated. The court disregarded the corporate entity, the stockholders
were treated as parties in interest, and the realty, it was decreed, would be
sold or divided without destroying the legal existence of the corporation. 8
COURTS. Attorneys: Disciplinary power. The integration rule of the
Florida Bar did not abrogate, repeal, or nullify any of the disciplinary
procedures in force at the time of its passage and adoption. Courts of
general jurisdiction still have the inherent power to deal with the alleged
misconduct of an attorney.29
Jurisdiction: Homestead. In a proceeding by an administrator to have
an estate declared to be homestead property, the County Judge had the
statutory power30 to determine homestead status of property when such is
put in issue. Such determination was not violative of the Constitutional
provision al giving exclusive jurisdiction of all actions involving real estate
to the circuit courts.
32
CRMINAL LAW. Habitual Criminal Statute. In order to prove the
accused guilty as a fourth offender under the state habitual criminal
statutc,33 it must be shown that all of the convictions were secured on
different days. To be held guilty as a second offender under a similar
statute, it must be shown that the offenses were, in each case, committed
subsequent to the conviction for the preceding offense. If the dates of the
convictions for two crimes show a greater interval than the sentence
imposed for the first crime, it will be inferred that the commission of
the second crime was subsequent to the conviction for the first.35
Jurors: Impeachment of verdict. It was error to grant a new trial
in a rape prosecution solely upon the juror's affidavit that he had failed
to register his objection to a verdict of guilty because of his erroneous
belief that a majority of voters was sufficient to convict.38
Lottery statute. In a prosecution for violation of the statute denouncing
participation in lotteries, 37 it was proper for the trial judge to charge the
jury that they should find the defendant guilty if they were convinced
that he had participated in lotteries either on the specific date set out
28. Kay v. Key West Development Co., 72 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1954).
29. State ex rel. Shciner v, Giblin, 73 So.2d 851 (Fla. 1954).
30. Fx. STAT. § 734.08 (1951).
31. Fxa. CONST. Art. V, §11.
32. In re Noble's Estate, 73 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1954).
33. Fz. STAT. §775.10 (1951).
34. FLA. 'STAT. §775.09 (1951).
35. Perry v. Mayo, Prison Custodian, 72 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1954).
36. State v. Ramirez, 73 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1954).
37. FLA. STAT. § 849.09 (1951).
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in the indictment or any any time within two years prior to the filing
of the infonnation. This charge was sustained even though the indictment
set out a specific date and defendant answered (over objection) questions
relating to his dealings in lotteries prior to that date.38
Procedure. The failure of the trial court to insert the letters "Jr."
after the accused's name in the indictment, information and record was
not reversible error.39
Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
and enter a plea of not guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. When the record revealed that defendant, at the time of the
filing of the plea of guilty, was fourteen years old, inexperienced, and without
counsel, it was an abuse of the court's discretion to deny this motion. 40
EVIDENCE. Dead Man Statute. In an action arising out of an auto-
mobile collision in which one of the parties died, it was neither reversible
error nor violative of the Florida "Dead Man" statute4' to permit the sur-
viving party to testify as to his own actions and the position and move-
ments of his own car. Such were independent facts and were not con-
sidered to be a part of any transaction or communication between the
parties.
42
FAMILY LAW. Common law marriages. Regardless of the feelings of
the judiciary, common law marriages are legal in Florida and can be
abolished only by the legislature. Such a marriage, once established, con-
tinues until dissolution by death or divorce. 3
FLORIDA. County Attorney: Computation of retirement benefits. In
computing retirement benefits for a county attorney, salary and special
fees for special services will both be considered in arriving at the
employees total compensation.1
4
Electoral approval: Legislative acts. The Constitutional requirement 4"
that special or local acts affecting cities and towns must be approved
by the electors of that city or town affected does not require that the
bill be set out, in its entirety, on the ballot.40
Practice of optometry. The statute 7  permitting physicians duly
licensed under the laws of the State to practice optometry without securing
38. Wheeler v. State, 72 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1954).
39. Mortellaro v. State, 72 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1954).
40. Paul v. State, 73 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1954).
41. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1951).
42. Kilmer v. Custason, 211 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1954). (Italics supplied).
43. In re Colson's Estate, 72, So.2d 57 (Fla. 1954).
44. Gay v. Blocker, 73 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1954).
45. FLA. CONST. Art. III, § 21.
46. Hill v. Milander, 72 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1954).
47. FLA. STAT. § 463.08 (1951).
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a special license did not include naturopaths within the scope of "duly
licensed physicians.
4
HIGHWAYS. Statutory regulation. Plaintiff was in the process of
passing defendant's truck when the truck suddenly tured left thereby
causing a collision with plaintiff's vehicle. The statute49 which provides
that no vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the road within 100
feet of an intersection was held not to apply here since plaintiff had
moved to the left before coming within 100 feet of the intersection. 0
INSURANCE. Limited liability policies. An insurer who acted in bad
faith in refusing to settle or negotiate a claim was held to be liable to
the insured for a judgment rendered in excess of the face of the limited
liability policy."'
Presumptions: Payment of first premium. Possession of a life insurance
policy by the insured at the time of his death raises the presumption that
the first premium of the policy had been paid. In the absence of
substantial evidence to rebut this presumption, those claiming under the
policy are entitled to a directed verdict. 2
Waiver. An insurance policy with double indemnity benefits provided
that such benefits should expire when the insured reached the age of 60.
By accepting premiums until the insured's death at the age of sixty-four,
the insurer was held to have waived the suspension date of the double
indemnity provision.53
LABOR LAW. Peaceful picketing. Picketing for an illegal purpose or
reason, even if peaceful, may be enjoined.54
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Imputed negligence. Plaintiff's declaration
which contained no allegation of any positive act of negligence on the
part of defendant but merely alleged that defendant city had permitted
and allowed the steps of the City Hall to become "worn smooth and
slick" was insufficient to impute negligence to the city.55
Payment of bonds. The City of Coral Cables could pledge its antici-
pated share of cigarette tax revenue for the payment of bonds without a
vote of approval from the freeholders. Since the levy on cigarettes is
an excise tax, it may be so used by the City without violating the constitu-
48. Weber v. Florida State Board of Optometry, 73 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1954).
49, FLA. STAT. §317.30(1)(b) (1951).
50. Clark v. Sumner, 72 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1954).
51. Tully v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 118 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
52. American Home Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Gibson, 72 So.2d 374 (Fla.
1954).
53. Peninsular Life Insurance Co. v. Howard, 72 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1954).
54. Treasure, Inc. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union,
Local No. 133 (A. F. of L.), 72 So.2d 670 (Fla, 1954),
55. Bucholtz v, City of Jacksonville, 72 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1954).
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tional provision requiring freeholder approval of contemplated bond issues.5 6
The same result was reached when the City of Tampa was permitted to
secure hospital revenue bonds by pledging her share of anticipated cigarette
tax revenue without approval of the electors.
5 7
NECLICENCE. Assumption of risk. Tenant was injured when she
tripped as a result of a power failure causing the lights in her apartment
to go out. Even if such failure was due to the landlord's neglect in not
improving the electrical system, tenant could not collect for injuries suffered
in her own apartment since, in the absence of fraud or concealment, she
assumed the risk as to the condition of the premises. Here, the rule of
caveat emptor applies. 5'
Automobiles: Guest statute. By statute,59 an automobile driver host
is not liable for injuries to his guest unless his negligence is gross.
"Gross negligence" means reprehensible conduct-more than the mere
lack of care exercised by a prudent person. Excessive speed alone does not
constitute gross negligence under this statute. 00
PERSONAL PROPERTY. Chattel mortgages: Acknowledgments. A cor-
poration executed a chattel mortgage by two of its officers. The acknowledge-
ment named the officers only, omitting any reference to the corporation.
However, the signing officials acknowledged that they had executed the
instrument for the purpose therein named. By looking to the complete
transaction, it was held that such an acknowledgment did not violate
the statutory provision6 ' requiring that the executing and acknowledging
parties be the same.
62
PROCEDURE. Appeal: Finality of decree. An order denying a motion for
dismissal of a petition for the construction of a will is not final or
determinative of the rights of the parties and, therefore, cannot be
appealed.63
Appeal: Finality of decree. In an action for tort, an order dismissing
the complaint without prejudice to plaintiff's right to proceed at law for
breach of contract was held to be not final and, hence, could not be
appealed.
14
Certiorari: Scope. Certiorari will not issue if the order sought to
be quashed is one which may be reviewed on direct appeal. An order
56. FLA. CONST. Art IX, §6; State v. City of Coral Gables, 72 So.2d 48 (Fla.1054).
57. State v. City of Tampa, 72 So.Zd 371 (Fla. 1954).
58. Nussbaum v. Sovereign Hotel Corp., 72 So.2d 814 (Fla. 1954).
59. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1951).
60. Ling v. Edenfield, 211 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1954).
61. FLA. STAT. § 695.03 (1951).
62. House of Lyon's, Inc. v. Marcus, 72 So. 2d 34 (Fla, 1954).
63. In re Peterson's Estate, 73 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1954).
64. Wood v. Sinclair Refining Co., 73 So.2d 226 (Fla. 1954),
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dissolving a writ of garnishment and discharging the garnishee was a
final and appealable judgment and, hence, certiorari would not lie.,"
Constructive service. In an in rem municipal tax foreclosure pro-
ceeding where service was attempted by publication, the erroneous desig-
nation of "Myrtle Danley" (the debtor) as "Myrtle Danby" was sufficient
error to mislead the reader. Claimants under the former owner of the
land were entitled to the property as against the tax title holder. The
doctrine of idem sonans was held not applicable here. 6
County Judge's Courts: Appeal. Statutes relating generally to appel-
late procedure are not applicable as regards appeals from the County
Judge's Court to the Circuit Court. Hence, the usual rule relating to the
computation of a period of time 7 does not apply to the time limit placed
on appeals taken from the County Judge's Court. The statute68 regulating
such appeals did not provide for the invocation of the usual rule; hence,
such rules did not apply despite subsequent procedural rules adopted by
The Supreme Court for the lower courts 9 since the County Judge's Courts
are not subject to those rules regulating the procedure of other lower
courts.70
Declaratory judgment. In a proceeding for a declaratory judgment
where both parties claimed full legal right and authority to enter into a
contract, a proceeding to have that right and authority declared was not
an adversary proceeding or a justiciable controversy and a declaratory
decree could not be entered.71
Dismissal without prejudice. In a stockholders derivative action,
plaintiff petitioned for a temporary restraining order; this motion was denied
and plaintiff sought to have the suit dismissed without prejudice. When
the defendants had not filed any pleadings and dismissal of the action
would not prejudice the rights of the defendant, plaintiff was entitled
to such a dismissal as a matter of right.72
Equity: Sufficiency of allegation. In attempting to enjoin the operation
of a house of ill fame as provided for by statute, 3 allegations stating only
the pleaders "firm conviction" that a nuisance was being maintained were
insufficientj 4
65. Slatcoff v. Dczen, 72 So.2d 800 (la. 1954).
66. Sinclair v. Alford, 72 So. 2d 783 (Ma. 1954).
67. Where the last day of a prescribed period of time falls on a Sunday or on a
legal holiday, the period shall be extended to the next day which is neither a Sunday
nor a legal holiday.
68. FLA. STAT. §732.16 (1951).
69. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 7(a); Equity Rules, rule 7 (a) (1951).
70. In re McRae's Estate, 73 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954).
71. Brautigam v. MacVicar, 73 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1954).
72. Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 72 So.Zd 664 (Fla. 1954).
73. FLA. STAT. § 64.11,823.05 (1951).
74. Ellis v. State ex tel. Marsh, County Solicitor, 73 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1954).
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Executors and administrators: Action for wrongful death. An ad-
imnistrator may not sue under the wrongful death statute7 5 unless the
non-existence of any party having a precedent right is affirmatively shown.
Such rights are determined as of the time of decedent's death. Hence,
allegations that no husband, minor child or dependent of decedent "now
survives" were insufficient since they did not necessarily indicate that
such was the case at the time of decedent's death3A
Summary judgments: Appeal. A summary final judgment, entered
on the determination that there is no genuine issue of fact, is reviewable
by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The filing of a motion for
rehearing or for a new trial after such judgment is rendered does not
stay or toll the time for prosecuting an appeal 7
Venue. A motion to change venue (for the convenience of the
parties as provided for by statute) 7 from a Florida District Court to
one in the District of Columbia was refused when the only reason offered
was that the witnesses were spread out along the Atlantic coast from
Massachusetts to Florida.79
Wrongful death action: Letters of administration. Decedent's father
filed an action for wrongful death before he received his letters of ad-
ministration. Once received, these letters related back to the time of
decedent's death and all acts beneficial to decedent's estate (even though
performed before the receipt of the letters) were validated. In the
absence of fraud or inequity, the original suit brought by the father
will be permitted to be prosecuted to its conclusion.'
REAL PROPERTY. Adverse possession. A tax deed executed by one of
the co-tenants will provide the grantee with sufficient title to claim title
by adverse possession under color of title as provided for by statute."'
Where defendant (grantee) has paid the taxes on the land in qucstion
for seven years, had improved and cultivated the land, and had" held
the land continuously for seven years, the statutory requirements8 2 for
possession and occupation under color of title had been satisfied.83
Condemnation proceedings: Attorney fees. In a condemnation pro-
ceeding, the mortgagee of the property in question was made a party
defendant. The mortgagee would be entitled to attorney fees only if
such was provided for by statute or contract. The statute84 providing for
75. FLA. STAT. § 768.01, 768.02 (1951).
76. Love v. Hannah, 72 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1954).
77. Weisberg v. Pere et ux,, 73 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1954).
78. 28 U.S.C. 4 1404 (a) (1948).
79. Seaboard Machine Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., Inc., 120 F. Supp, 591
(N.D. Fla. 1954).
80. Griffin v. Workman, 73 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1954).
81. FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1951).
82. FLA. STAT. 1 95.17 (1951).
83. Morrison v. Byrd, 72 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1954).
84. FLA. STAT. § 73.11 (1951).
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the payment of reasonable attorney fees to defendant's attorney in a
condemnation proceeding was held not to apply here; the mortgage was
held to be a mere lienor and without the scope of this statute dealing
with payment of fees to "owners" of land in a condemnation proceeding.
Since the mortgagee had no estate or interest in the land, he could not
recover his attorney fees despite a subsequent statute s5 which authorized
the court, on proper petition, to determine the rights of the mortgagee
in a condemnation award. 86
Real Estate brokers. Plaintiff real estate broker was engaged by
defendant to find a purchaser for his property. Even though the brokerage
contract provided that the commission be paid when the deal was closed
and the purchaser made payments, defendant was liable to plaintiff for
brokerage fees when plaintiff found a customer agreeable to defendant
and a contract of sale was executed, the only reason for non-performance
being defendant's refusal.8
Recordation statute: Limitation of claims. Defendant grantee did
not record his deed until twenty-one years after the grant. The adminis-
tratrix of the grantor sold the land to another one month before defendant
recorded his deed. The statute88 limiting claims against lands where
deeds have been recorded for twenty years or more and rendering absolutely
valid a deed of record for more than twenty years had as its purpose the
perfection of what might otherwise have been a defective title; it was
not its purpose to destroy an otherwise valid conveyance of a recorded
deed simply because the conveyance was not recorded. Defendant's claim
to title was not defeated by this statute.80
TAXATION. Priority of liens. A specific and perfected lien for ad
valorem taxes filed by a Florida County and attached to the taxpayer's
property has priority over a subsequent lien filed by the United States
for u'paid income and excess profits taxes even though the taxpayer was
insolvent.90
Tax liens: Statutory limitation. By statute91 liens on real property
for unpaid intangible personal property taxes become void after seven
years from the date of issuance of execution. In the absence of such
statutory provision, such liens would have continued to be effective until
the taxes were paid.
92
TRADE REGULATION. Florida Fair Trade Act: Non-signer clause. The
non-signer clause of the Florida Fair Trade Act9 3 is, as to non-signers,
85. FLA. STAT. § 73.12 (1951).
86. Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954).
87. Miller v. Moylan, 73 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1954).
88. FLA. STAT. § 95.23 (1951).
89. Moyer v. Clark, 72 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1954).
90. U.S. v. Atlantic Municipal Corp., 212 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1954).
91. FLA. STAT. § 199.01 ft seq. (1951).
92. Gay v. Rutherford, 73 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1954).
93. FLA. STAT. C. 541 (1953).
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unconstitutional and void as being an invalid use of the police power.
Since the real purpose of this clause is anti-competitive price fixing, it
must fall as being against the public policy of the state and as an invalid
use of the state police power for a private rather than a public purpose.
9 4
TRUSTS. Constructive trusts. A bill in equity alleging that a party,
with knowledge, accepted property belonging to a partnership from an
individual partner without the consent of the partnership for a debt owed
by the individual partner stated a cause of action for a constructive
trust.95
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION. Advance payments. Under statute, 8
the employer may use advance payments of compensation (i.e., payments
made before the compensation award is rendered) as credits against
unpaid installments of compensation due. However, the employee will
not be required to repay such advances if they were in excess of his com-
pensation award97 or if they were intended to be gratuities. Payments
made in excess of the award will be presumed to be gratuities but other
advance payments will be characterized in accordance with the intent
of the parties.
8
Burden of proof. Injuries caused by lightning striking the claimant
while she was engaged in her employment are compensable. Once the
claimant shows that the injury closely followed after the building in which
she was working was struck by lightning, it is the burden of the employer
to overcome the presumption that the lightning was the cause of the
injury. When doubt exists, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the
claimant."
County employees. A deputy sheriff, though not an employee, was
an officer not elected at the polls and was, therefore, covered by The
Workmen's Compensation Act)" The County was liable for compensation
benefits for injuries or death sustained in the discharge of his official
duties.1 1
Deputy Commissioner: Evidentiary findings of fact. The findings of
fact made by the Deputy Commissioner hearing a workman's compensation
case are binding on The Industrial Commission and reviewing courts
unless there is no competent substantial evidence upon which to base such
findings. In considering the weight of evidence necessary to support such
a finding, the "preponderance of evidence" rule is not applicable.' 
2
94. Miles Laboratories v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
95. Brown v. Skinner, 73 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1954).
96. FLA. STAT. § 44 0 .20(11) (1953).
97. Rules of Procedure of The Florida Industrial Commission, rule 9.
98. Daoud v. Matz, 73 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1954).
99. Lyng v. Rao, 72 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1954).
100. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1) (1951).
101. Parker v. Hill, 72 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1954).
102. Four Branches, Inc. v. Oechsner, 73 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1954).
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Illegal employment: Double compensation. The statutory provision" 'I
for double compensation to minors who are injured while they are employed
in violation of The Child Labor Act applies only to those occupations
which are forbidden by that act;104 mere failure of the employer to procure
an age certificate as required by that statute'05 and the subsequent injury
of the employed minor will not give rise to an action for double com-
pensation unless, at the time of the injury, the minor was employed in
one of the forbidden occupations. 06
Industrial Commission: Review. A statute'0 7 providing that orders
of the Industrial Commission could be subject to review by certiorari if
the petition was filed within thirty days from the date of the filing of
the order was superseded by the rule governing common law writs of
certiorari0 8 that required such petitions to be filed within 60 days from
the date that the order was entered. 09
Liability of carriers: Limitations. The compensation insurance carrier
is not liable to the state mental hospital for the care and treatment of
an employee who, as a result of an injury received in the course of
employment, was committed to the hospital by judicial process. Such
care and treatment does not fall within the purview of the statute"10
dealing with the employer's duty and the carrier's liability to furnish
medical and hospital care."'
Notice of controversy. The provision of the Workman's Compensation
Act which requires the employer to file notice of controversy" 12 is not
intended to benefit the claimant nor is it intended to entitle the claimant,
in the absence of such notice, to proceed ex parte. It was proper for the
Deputy Commissioner to consider an employer's evidence even though
the employer had not filed notice of controversy as required by statute." 3
Occupational disease. Claimant contracted an occupational disease
(dermatitis) while working for defendant. He subsequently left defendant's
employ to work for another, again exposing himself to the hazard that
caused the disease. By statute," 4 claimant's only remedy was against
the last employer in whose employ he was exposed to the hazard that
caused the disease; an action against the first employer would not lie." 5
103. FiA. STAT. § 440.54 (1951).
104. FLA. STAT. § 450.08 (1951).
105. Fi. STAT. § 450.04 (1951).
106. Ship v, Farrens Tree Surgeons, Inc., 72 So.2d 387 (Fla. 1954).
107. FA. STAT. § 440.27(1) (1951).
108. FiLA. STAT. Supreme Court Rules, rule 28 (e) (1951).
109. American Automotive Co. v. Stuta, 72 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1954).
110. FLA. STAT. § 440.13 (1951).
111. Continental Casualty Co. v. Buchanan, 72 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1954).
112. F A. STAT. § 440.20 (1951).
113. Virginian, Inc. v. Ponder, 72 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1954).
114. FL. STAT. § 440.151(5) (1951).
115. Mundy v. McLean, 72 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1954).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Waiver of benefits: Action at law. In an action by an employee who
had elected not to accept Workman's Compensation benefits" O against
his employer, no recovery may be had if the employer was free of
negligence or if the employee's negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the injury. However, mere contributory negligence on the part
of the employee will not bar recovery,117
Unlawful employment: Remedy. Plaintiff, a fifteen year old employee
of defendant was injured while performing his duties (running a power
driven machine). Although plaintiff was unlawfully employed," 8 he was
of employable age"19 and, since the exclusive remedy available to plaintiff
was the Workman's Compensation Act, 20 an action at common law
could not be maintained.' 2
1
116. FLA. STAT. C. 440 (1951).
117. FLA. STAT. § 440.06 (1951); Baker v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.,
212 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1954).
118. FLA. STAT. § 450.061 (I) (a) (1953).
119. FLA. STAT. § 450.021 (19J3)
120. FLA. STAT. c. 440 (1953).
121. Winn-Lovett Tampa v. Murphree, 73 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1954).
